There are at least three ways to approach The inventin if culture: 1) emphasize the almost complete originality or untmely character of the book; 2) identfy its debt to authors contemporary with it or to those from the recent or remote past; or 3) atempt a judicious balance between the frst and second optons. For numerous reasons, I deliberately chose the frst alternatie.
From this point of iiew, we could initally obserie that the frst editon of The inventin if culture, in 1975, was almost simultaneous with two other books by North American anthropologists that marked contemporary anthropology: The interpretatin if cultures, by Cliford Geertz, and Culture and practcal reasin, by Marshall Sahlinspublished, respectiely, in 1973 and 1976. The destny of these three books, howeier, contnues to be quite diferent. Ultmately, the last two achieied wide renown and a success that the frst is only beginning to achieie and will achieie to the same degree only with difculty. In Brazil, for example, the book by Geertz was translated, eien if only partally, in 1987, and that of Sahlins in 1979 3 . Untl today, it is rare to fnd a course in anthropological theory that does not include them in its bibliography.
The inventin if culture, on the other hand, had to wait 35 years to be translated, in an excellent initatie by the publishing house Cosac Naify in a beautful translaton by Marcela Coelho de Souza and Alexandre Morales. Therefore, it is almost ineiitable to speculate about what the destny of Brazilian anthropology would haie been if the book by Wagner had already been translated in the 1970s and the other two had not. Maybe we would not be teaching an anthropology so remoied from what is efectiely done in the discipline today; maybe we would haie resisted more efectiely the imperialism of the constructonist and deconstructonist analyses that make reference to an atemporal power and ineiitable hidden manipulatons behind any context; maybe nothing would haie happened.... Anyway, what is not easy to imagine is the translatons of the books by Geertz and Sahlins haiing to wait 35 years after their inital publicaton to be released.
The "message" of these books seems so well adapted to the tme in which they were writen that it is difcult to conceiie of them in any other context. In summary, in two cases, we obserie an atempt to saie culturalism from what we could say was always its 'best enemy', naturalist reductonism, in other words, that without which cultural anthropology simply could not functon, in so far as its "other", nature, which defnes, albeit equiiocally, what culture deielops, interprets, symbolizes or transcends, would be missing.
We also obserie, eien if briefy, that this naturalism presented itself, both to Geertz and Sahlins, under a double form. On one hand, the so called ecological or materialist anthropologies, that both fatly rejected; on the other, the much more complex, nuanced, and, maybe, unexpected iersion of LeiiStraussian structuralism. Only two years prior to the publicaton of the book by Geertz, Leii-Strauss concluded his mythological trilogy with the book signifcantly enttled The Naked Man, in which the demonstraton of the incredible sophistcaton that indigenous thought was capable of seemed to nullify any possibility of reducton. Leii-Strauss concludes his book howeier, with the precipitous afrmaton that at the end of the day, this thought is nothing more than a product of the actiity of the human brain, itself a product of the complex process of natural eioluton. This Sahlins defned as higher naturalism 4 . Geertz in his turn defned it as hypermidern intellectualism 5 . Howeier, if Geertz seems to simply refuse the Leii-Straussian alternatie, seeking refuge in a hermeneutc that iniariably functons as a sophistcated exit for those who do not like the noton of structure, the reacton of Sahlins is diferent. Originatng from a materialist and neo-eiolutonist anthropological traditon, a stay in Paris led him to imagine the possibility of, so to speak, grounding structuralism in culturalism, making the "structures of the mind" the "instruments of culture", not their "conditon" 6 , and of the structure itself only a part of culture and history.
The book by Wagner takes a quite diferent approach, be it in terms of Geertzian interpretatonism, or the structured culturalism of Sahlins. It is so diferent, that today we may haie the impression that it is not only one or two years that separate The inventin if culture from the other two books, but more like half a century! Indeed, if The interpretatin if culture and Culture and practcal reasin appear today like the beginning of the end (in the double sense of completng and ending) of a fin de sièccle anthropology (20th century), The inventin if culture seems to announce the beginning of something else, that we could take to be one of the possibilites aiailable to anthropology in the 21st century.
In this regard, it may be worth notng that the central leitmitfs of the work of Geertz and Sahlins, interpretaton and symbolizaton respectiely, are not neglected by Wagner, eien if they are referenced only to introduce further refecton. Therefore, from the beginning of the book, "interpretaton" appears in the form of the "modern American interpretatie culture" (p. 10), a theme that will be deieloped in the secton "The magic of adiertsing" (pp. 49-56) from Chapter 3, in a manner quite distnct from that of Geertz. This is because what Geertz treats as a methodological tool that merely extends and makes more sophistcated a procedure inherent to all human cultures (precisely "interpretaton"), Wagner understands as a singularity of a partcular "North American" culture. More precisely, it could well be that interpretaton is a uniiersal way of dealing with the world and society, but the problem is that this generality does not tell us anything about its functon in concrete or specifc situatons. This means, of course, that it can operate perfectly well according to the basic mechanics of tools labeled ethnocentric: proposing as uniiersal, what is actually a partcular characteristc of the culture of the anthropologists themselies. In this case, Wagner insists on trying to make the conientonal character of the culture in which we liie increasingly clear, or what would be the same thing, motiatng a desire to become more self-conscious of that which, he argues, determines us. In anthropology, we know well where this ended up going, with our partcular iersion of "postmodernism", and it is not by accident that it was unfaithful students or disciples of Geertz who introduced this trend amongst us 7 .
Before considering so called anthropological postmodernism, howeier, we see that the oppositon between "practcal reason" and "cultural reason", that structures the book of Sahlins, is in some way reconsidered in The inventin if culture. Howeier, contrary to the epic style of Sahlins, which opposes two reasons almost like God and the deiil, Wagner highlights how the two iarietes of anthropology deriied from this oppositon share the same foundaton or, at least, meet a common need. If the naturalist or naturalizing anthropologies (analyzed in the secton "Controlling culture", pp. 99 -101, chap. 6) atributes a highly determined and determining character to nature, the efect (the "counterinienton") of this atributon is to establish a rigorous cintril on culture, eliminatng eierything creatie and indeterminate that it may contain. On the other hand, (as shown in the secton "controlling nature", pp. 102-105, chap. 6), but in a symmetrical way, the culturalist anthropologies (and nothing stops the two iarietes being able to coexist in iaried doses) will atribute all or almost all power of determinaton to culture, such that cintril will now coincide with the side of nature, whose power and indeterminaton from now on will appear as mere simple limits to culture itself.
Neither interpretaton nor symbolizaton, the central concept of the book by Wagner is obiiously inienton. In this sense howeier, it is necessary to be careful. As Martn Holbraad obseries in the excellent sleeie notes writen for the Brazilian editon, the term "inienton" has the bad habit of awakening a series of associatons, all equally inadequate for the correct understanding of the sense of the Wagnerian concept. Generally speaking, when hearing the word "inienton", we are almost always led to notons such as "artfce", in the bad sense of the word, that is, to that which is "artfcial" or opposed to "real". In the Hiuaiss Brazilian Portuguese dictonary defniton, "invençãi" ["inienton"] is an imagined thing that presents itself as true; inienton, fantasy"; "a thing imagined in a cleier way, frequently with a hidden objectie"; or "which does not belong to the real world; imaginaton, fable, fcton, decepton".
Obiiously it is also "productie or creatie imaginaton, creatie capacity; inientieness, inientie"; and "ability to create, to conceiie or put into practce something new, of realizing an idea, a concepton; creaton".
For reasons that Wagner himself explains, anthropologists seem to prefer negatie to positie defnitons. Therefore, when we speak of the "inienton of traditons", we immediately imagine that these are "false", in the sense of not corresponding to the history that they tell about themselies, and that certainly they were created by someone with unknowable objecties. Maybe giien this, in the brief pist scriptum that he wrote for the Brazilian editon, Wagner obseries, curiously, that "in a certain sense, inienton is absolutely not an inientie process, but a process of ibviatin" (p. 240). If it was not possible in 1975 or 1981 to imagine the directon that the understanding of the noton of inienton would take, in 2010 we know exactly how things haie unfolded. And this, eien though The inventin if culture calls atenton to how "traditons are as much dependent on contnuous reinienton as on idiosyncrasies, details and quirks" (p. 94). This means that "inienton" and "innoiaton" are not the same thing (p. 77) that all traditon is iniented and that, in an expression such as "inienton of traditons" the frst term (process of inienton) should be much more important than the second (which had simply been iniented).
Further on, we will see how to free the noton of inienton from its critcal status. Howeier, frstly, if it is worth clearly distnguishing the thought of Roy Wagner from that of the most important North American anthropologists more or less contemporary with him . This is done precisely to juxtapose the notons of "inienton" and "representaton", in other words, to illustrate the central point of Writng culture, that the ethnography that anthropologists write is a work of fcton, not a representaton of reality. It is the critcal sense of the noton of inienton that operates, but now giien an apparent positiity that it did not haie.
The aim here, howeier, is not to atempt to resurrect the dead, nor anthropological postmodernism, nor the traditonal critcisms that were directed at it. A quarter of a century later, I belieie that the best that we can say of the so called postmoderns is that they were able to raise some iery important questons, eien if they did not ofer interestng answers to any of them! This is probably because their objecties were neier to respond to them, but, as one says, to adopt an "ironic" posture, in other words, that of someone who at least knew that they knew nothing or cannot know it with certainty. This attude is possibly responsible for the ultmate inability to transform the "critcism of representaton" and the declaraton of the ineiitably fctonal character of ethnography into a new beginning for anthropology. Finally, as the Nigerian author Chinua Achebe wrote, although all "fcton was undoubtedly fcttous it could also be true or false, not with the truth or falsehood of a news item but as to its disinterestedness, its intenton, its integrity" 10 .
This new beginning required the more consistent unifcaton of the critque of representaton as a form of knowledge and power. In other words, it required the renunciaton of representaton not because it is false or fctonal, nor because it is always a power relaton that giies someone the right to represent the other, but rather because the representaton is part of the extension of power relatons that the capitalist West established with the other societes of the planet, within the anthropological text 11 . It is precisely the recogniton of the immanent character of the power relatons established within the anthropological text that can open lines of fight for the writer/anthropologist. This is because they are in proximity with the power relatons in this space, the anthropological text itself, that is partally under their control. Therefore, it is possible to raise the queston at the same tme epistemological, ethical and politcal: how do we proceed so as not to reproduce, in the sphere of the producton of anthropological knowledge, the relatons of dominaton to which the groups with which anthropologists work fnd themselies submited?
It was not necessary to go iery far to fnd an answer. It was enough to connect the critcism of anthropology as representaton with that, a litle older, which critcized anthropological knowledge, exposing its dependency on the colonialist enterprise, not in the megalomaniacal sense that would make anthropology fundamental knowledge for colonialism, but, as Talal Asad 12 argued, in the way in which colonialism is too important for anthropology, obliging it, consequently, to seek to break this politcal, ethical and epistemological dependency:
Historical anthropology mirrored the ideology of the late colonial and supraethnic empires of Britain, France, Central Europe, and others. (These empires quite literally "did" Cultural eioluton and difusion as a mater of policy.) Systemic anthropology refected the ratonal urgency of wartme mobilizaton and the economic natonstate (p. 231).
While atenton to this relaton between anthropological schools and concepts and colonialist and imperialist enterprises (established here in a way that we could qualify as immanent or intrinsic) demonstrates the interest of Wagner in the questons raised by Asad, the excerpt that follows shows that the line of fight that Wagner traces follows a quite diferent trajectory from that emphasized in the collecton organized by the Asad 13 :
The curious "eioluton" in which each one of the successiie paradigmatc episodes worked itself into an obiiaton and contradicton of its original assumptons proiides the most compelling eiidence for the nature of anthropology as an academic discipline. It is a holding acton against relatiity, a kind of theoretcal fxatie that builds introspectie insight into culturally supportie theory (pp. 213-232).
Wagner bets, therefore, on radicalizing the subiersiie power of the ethnographic practce of anthropology, but not on the analysis of the relatons themselies between anthropology and colonialism or imperialism, as capable of breaking with the dependency of the frst in relaton to the second.
Therefore, the main problem of anthropological post-modernism, as Wagner showed in a litle known reiiew that he wrote for Writng culture 14 , is the intenton to "do with ethnography what a more self-assured and less cynical anthropology ('Grand Theory,' as the cant goes) did with theory-deielop powerful and decisiie canons of comprehension". In other words, introduce into ethnography itself the control mechanisms generally employed by theory. Therefore, if traditonal anthropology operates as a type of critque of fact, like an art critcism that atempts to show that, as great as the noielty of what is being presented may appear to be, "it's all been said before" (p. 109) and in truth, nothing is happening, the post-modernist anthropologist can be understood as the critc of a "theater of fact", using "authority" ("the play within the play" as Wagner defnes it) as an additonal form of control. Neither the ideas, nor the facts should haie the power to surprise anybody! To trace this line of fight, Wagner frstly had to redefne, or to redirect, both the noton of inienton as well as that of culture. It is giien this that each word of the ttle of this book, including the artcle and the prepositon, are fundamental and need to be clearly understood. To begin with, what does "inienton" mean in The inventin if culture?
At the beginning of What is Philisiphy?, Deleuze and Guatari 15 , after proiisionally defning this actiity as "the art of forming, inientng, or fabricatng concepts", and arguing that concepts, in truth, "are not necessarily forms, fndings or products", conclude that "philosophy, more rigorously, is the discipline that consists of creatng concepts". I would risk saying that in the book by Wagner, the noton of inienton should be rigorously understood in the sense established by Deleuze and Guatari for the noton of creatin 16 . This means that "inienton" for Wagner, is not the impositon of an external, actie form on inert mater, nor the discoiery of a pure noielty, nor a manufacturing of a fnal product startng from raw material. This distances it from the most recurrent models used in the West to think the act of creaton: the Greek hylomorphic model 17 , the Judeo-Christan creaton ex nihili, or the capitalist model of producton and property 18 . Wagnerian inienton is of the order of a contnuous metamorphosis, as occurs in the majority of the cosmologies studied by anthropologists, in which forces, the world and beings are always created and recreated startng from something preexistent. This fnding leads to a series of consequences.
The frst is that this concept of inienton-creaton has more to do with art than with science and technics. It is not by accident that the paintngs of Bruegel, Rembrandt, Rubens and Vermeer, the poetry of Morgenstern and Rilke, the music of Beethoien, Haydn, Mozart, and jazz appear throughout the book as a way of explaining anthropological actiity. This actiity is precisely defned in terms of its creatvity, a term that generates the ttle of the second chapter ("Culture as creatiity") and that appears directly or correlatiely, more than one hundred tmes throughout the text. The partcularity of anthropology is that the creatiity of the anthropologist depends on another (and others): the creatiity of the people with whom they choose to liie during a period of their liies. Here, we touch on a fundamental point, because the recogniton of the creatiity of those we "study" is, for Wagner, a conditon of possibility for anthropological practce. More than this, the anthropologist should be prepared and disposed to assume two premises: 1) recognize in those that they study the same leiel of creatiity that they belieie themselies to possess; and 2) not assimilate the form or "style" of creatiity that we fnd in the feld with that with which we are accustomed and that anthropologists themselies practce.
Therefore, Wagner is the frst to propose a true constructiism for anthropology, or at least, to elaborate the fulfllment of what had long ago been established by Malinowski when declaring feld work to be the only procedure adequate for the then "modern" anthropology. In 1935, Malinowski argued that feld work should be, aboie all else, a constructie or creatie actiity, giien that ethnographic facts "did not exist". Therefore a "method for the discoiery of iniisible facts by way of constructie inference" 19 was necessary, an understanding that unfortunately, did not seem to haie much impact throughout the history of the discipline.
Therefore, once again we must be careful. Wagnerian constructiism (as well as Malinowskian) has litle or nothing to do with the pseudo politcal rhetoric of the infamous social constructiism. This, as is known, is dedicated to afrming the "socially constructed" character of whateier it maybe (from kinship relatons to genes and planets), but concedes a strange right of excepton to its own procedures, as well as to that to which it atributes the role of great architect, that is to say, the social and politcal mechanisms that only the analyst has the ability to perceiie. Therefore, there is no doubt that social agents pass all their tme constructng, but, unfortunately, they are unable to perceiie that they are "constructng", "naturalizing" and "essentalizing", as is said, eierything that they thought they found in their path, but that in truth they had constructed. It is the role of the analyst, therefore, to "deconstruct" these illusions, which means strangely, that social constructonism and deconstructonism would mean exactly the same thing. Durkheim at least knew what this "society" is, that creates eierything, but was itself not created: God -and nothing could be more diferent from the idea of a creatie inienton of culture. It is giien this, howeier, that "feldwork is work in the feld" (p. 22)
Howeier, there are those who think that the positon of Wagner coincides with this generalized fetshism from which only the anthropologist is exempt, this species of "creatonism of the poor", as Latour defned it 20 . The problem is that when we suppose that the culture studied by anthropologists is "socially constructed", not only "the inienton of culture" becomes an "artfce" but at tmes, the people themselies become "socially constructed" for the interested anthropologist 21 . Giien this, obiiously, it is necessary to imagine a "natie-initself" (for example, the Daribi of the Papua New Guinea Highlands, whom Wagner studied, or the Bororo of Central Brazil) absolutely impenetrable to our understanding, which, regardless, becomes surprisingly powerful and farsighted when determining the true politcal and social moties and causes that led the anthropologist to "construct" the natie in this or that manner.
Wagner, howeier, neier afrms that the anthropologist inients culture because there is nothing to see or because they are incapable of understanding what they think they see. The problem is diferent. It is that there are too many things to see, too many ideas to be understood and so litle tme in which to do it. The anthropologist does what he can, inientng culture to try to confer a minimum of order and intelligibility where the plenitude of life dispenses with them completely. Therefore, Wagner is probably the frst anthropologist to make life (and not eioluton, history, functon, structure, cogniton...) the fnal referent of anthropological work. In additon to founding constructiism in anthropology, he also founds a type of anthropological iitalism 22 .
Constructiism, howeier, can only functon if it is complete and generalized, and the obligaton of the anthropologist is that their creaton makes the creatiity on which it itself depends (its own) appear and, principally, that of the people with whom they work. They resemble therefore, one of the mythological demiurges that they study who created a world, where another world had already and always existed. In this process, there are two temptatons which we should resist: imagine that they are only "representng" what exists in itself and for itself; or pretend that they are creatng from nothing.
In both cases, the creatiity of those whom we study is denied. In the frst, which corresponds, generally, to the anthropologies that Wagner designates as "diachronic" or "historical" and "synchronic" or "systematc" (p. 107), this refusal is hidden, under an apparent afrmaton. In the end, if anthropologists do nothing other than represent other cultures, only the people that liie there can be responsible for these cultures. The problem is that these anthropologists only afrm such a creatiity to deny it, by atributng the determinant role to forces of which people know nothing and do not control: eioluton, order, functon, sense, the unconscious or whateier it maybe. In the second case, which corresponds more or less to the post-modernisms, constructonisms and deconstructonisms of recent years, we would be returning to an eien more absolute refusal: natie creatiity is iiewed as a type of chimera to which we simply haie no access. Unconscious in one case, unthinkable in the other, the role of the natie is to serie as a substrate for the academicism 23 of the representaton or the pretext for the pessimism of a fcton. Both free us from all risk, leaiing us intact and unscathed, but, at the same tme, unable to be afected or modifed, in other words, preiented from thinking:
The crucial step -which is simultaneously ethical and theoretcal -is that of remaining true to the implicatons of our assumpton of culture. If our culture is creatie, then the "cultures" we study, as other examples of this phenomenon, must also be. For eiery tme we make others part of a "reality" that we alone inient, denying their creatiity by usurping the right to create, we use those people and their way of life and make them subseriient to ourselies (p. 21).
If creatiity is a general phenomenon, eien if it always manifests itself through specifc styles, the anthropologist deals with a specifc type of inienton, that "of culture". In 1975, it would not be difcult to say of culture what Descartes had said of common sense: that it is the most widely shared commodity in the world 24 . Inienton, on the other hand, seemed a priiilege of the few (we ourselies, actually). Thirty fie years later, things seemed to haie changed. Inienton, in the bad sense of the word, obiiously, seems to be eierywhere, and culture (or traditon) only exists because it is an inienton of naties and/or anthropologists defending their own interests.
Wagner, in some way, had already inierted this picture. It is inienton, in the good sense of creatiity that consttutes the plane of consistency for all humans (and maybe not only for humans). The inienton of culture, on the other hand, corresponds to a more specifc historical episode (cultural), which took place at a certain moment of the history of the Western world. It is in this sense that we can say that Wagner elaborates a properly cultural noton of culture, by establishing that the explanaton that the noton of culture is itself a cultural artfact or the product of a specifc cultural point of iiew, our own, is in fact an intrinsic and consttutie part of it.
The fundamental point, howeier is that the "Western" origin of the noton is not a testament to impotence or to its being malign, but only the sign of a work to be contnually renewed. Therefore, that our noton of culture is deriied from that of "cultiaton" and later on receiied its sense from the "opera house" (p. 24), only becomes problematc when we interrupt the process of deriiaton or "metaphorizaton" (p. 24), making literal a sense that is always local, transitory and unstable. Each person thinks and speaks with words and categories which they haie at hand, and the big queston is how to proceed so that they are able to say more, or something else, beyond the usual, while stll maintaining its intelligibility 25 .
Here, we should go back a few steps. The brief presentaton of modern North American culturalist anthropology at the beginning of this reiiew intentonally left out what is certainly the most important "infuence" on Wagner, his doctoral superiisor, Daiid Schneider, to whom The inventin if culture is dedicated. Next to Geertz and Sahlins, Schneider completes the group of authors who in some sense fnish (in the double sense of the word) anthropological culturalism. Now, the fundamental point of the work of Schneider
26
, and his originality in relaton to the other culturalists I belieie resided in this, consists in arguing that eien though it is ineiitable to iniestgate other cultures based on our categories (kinship, in this case), this cannot lead us to imagine that our categories are uniiersal. Therefore, and to the contrary of what many think, I do not belieie that the book by Schneider simply condemns the anthropological study of kinship for being, at the end of the day, a "western category" (which one would not be?). It is, rather, to use kinship in a way that Wagner would designate as "analogical" (see, for example, p. 18). In this sense, The inventin if culture can be read as an extension of the proposal of Schneider: why do we just focus on kinship giien that the iery noton of culture is also exclusiiely "ours"?
Once again, this does not mean condemning anthropology for being a western endeaior. It certainly is, but the queston is what can be done based on this understanding. Therefore, we see that the noton of culture as cultiaton was analogically extended to that of "opera house" culture, which allows us to imagine that the anthropological noton of culture consists in a new analogical extension:
The anthropological usage of "culture" consttutes a further metaphorizaton, if not a democratzaton, of this essentally elitst and aristocratc sense. It amounts to an abstract extension of the noton of human refnement and domestcaton from the indiiidual to the collectie, so that we can speak of culture as man's general control, refnement, and improiement of himself, rather than one man's conspicuousness in this respect (p. 24).
One of the central arguments underpinning
The inventin if culture is that both the historical changes (such as those the critcs of colonial anthropology emphasize) and theoretcal changes (those that the post-moderns liked so much) required a new extension of the concept of culture, one that was able to connect it to inientoncreaton, recognizing therefore in "cultures" a creatiity whose uniiersality, howeier, could not hide the singularites of the local styles.
This mechanism for extending meaning is what Wagner refers to as metaphor, allegory or more usually, analigy, and corresponds, therefore, to "diferentaton". The analogical procedure should obey three fundamental principles. Firstly, it can only operate in a feld of diferences, which means that, eiidently, we only need analogies when we confront situatons which at frst sight are irreducible to those that are habitual for us, that is, analogy is not a synonym for similarity. Secondly, neither of the two terms placed in relaton by analogy should be situated on a plane superior to the other, as if the frst was capable of reiealing the hidden truth of the second; analogy does not mean explanaton. Finally, the two terms should be afected by the process, such that the Western concept of culture, for example, has to be at least lightly subierted when it series as an analogy for natie life, which means that the analogy is of the order of a relaton: "the idea of "relatonship" is important here because it is more appropriate to the bringing together of two equiialent enttes, or iiewpoints, than notons like "analysis" or "examinaton," with their pretensions of absolute objectiity" (p. 29).
In this sense, culture can only be iniented in situatons of "culture shock" (p. 15), a shock which, paradoxically, preexists the culture itself; and it is because of this, as well, that "all human beings are 'anthropologists', an inientor of culture" (p. 34) in situatons of inital unintelligibility. This means, at the same tme, an important point to try to aioid the traditonal anthropological hubris, that all anthropologists are only human beings, operatng under more or less special conditons. To the contrary of the traditonal intenton, the maximum that we can hope for is to liie in two (or more) worlds or diferent ways of liiing, but not between cultures, as if we were capable of transcending them:
Thus gradually, in the course of feldwork, he himself becomes the link between cultures through his liiing in both of them, and it is this "knowledge" and competence that he draws upon in describing and explaining the subject culture. "Culture" in this sense draws an iniisible equal sign between the knower (who comes to know himself) and the known (who are a community of knowers) (p. 13).
Therefore, the status of the noton of culture throughout The inventin if culture is iery complex, giien that Wagner seems to defne it in diferent ways or, to be more precise, looks at it from diferent angles. It appears now in a strong sense, now in a weak sense, which does not mean to say that the frst is beter than the second. "Culture" begins by being defned as what eierybody has; subsequently, as what only we haie and what the other only has because we put it there; subsequently as that which nobody has; and fnally, as that which eierybody has because we create in specifc relatonal situatons. In terms of Wagner himself, culture begins as giien and goes onto the order of the constructed, frstly as a false inienton and later, as an inienton-creaton.
We moie on now to the "of" that separates "inienton" and "culture". Our academic habits are so deep seated that they can lead us to imagine that this prepositon signifed that it is only culture that is iniented. If this was true, howeier, the whole book would lose its sense, since its central point is precisely to show that the inienton of culture is inseparable from that which culture inients. "Iniented" culture basically corresponds to what Wagner denominates "conienton", "inientie" culture which he calls "diferentaton", maybe the central concept of the book.
Conienton and diferentaton consttute, frstly, the two basic mechanisms of the partcular semiotc adopted by Wagner. In this sense, a crucial point is that they do not consttute two "types" of things, but two faces of the same reality (see p. 40). Symbolizing is always using in a "diferentated" way, symbols that are part of "conienton", and it is only the respectie weight of each procedure in each symbolic act that iaries. Giien this, ""the distncton is more iniolied than simplistc 'progressiieconseriatie' dichotomies, aptly parodied by Marshall Sahlins as 'the West and the Rest'" (p. 16).
On the other hand, when we compare our own culture or, more precisely, the "modern, North American interpretatie culture", with the Daribi, or with any group that Wagner designates alternately with combinatons of the substanties classes, groups, peoples, societes, traditons and with labor, ethnic, non-ratonalist, religious, tribal and rural adjecties, we haie the sensaton that the iniestment in the conientonal and in the diferentator changes place. Therefore, we tend to imagine that our rules are purely conientonal, that which we make and, consequently, the domain that is under our responsibility (p. 19 ) and where we would iniest our creatiity. Howeier, the Daribi and many others seem to imagine the contrary, that is, that this kingdom, for us conientonal and constructed, is a given. Up untl now there is nothing much new, images of primities liiing under the reign of a traditon that is considered transcendent are well established. What makes Roy Wagner the most original of the anthropologists since LeiiStrauss is haiing proposed the missing queston: where, then, do these "primities" iniest their creatiity? In an enormous efort to singularize themselies in the face of a giien conienton, is the response.
This has enormous consequences. While the West was constructed, oier the centuries, the hypothesis (that is taken as giien) of a nature "outside" and, howeier, controllable (p. 225), the Daribi, the Bororo and others seem to prefer the "world as hypothesis", that neier submits itself to the rigorous demands of 'proof' or fnal legitmaton, a ninscientfic world (p. 171). Howeier, once again, there is no need to see here one more great diiision:
Man is so many things, one is tempted to introduce him in a partcularly bizarre get-up just to show what he can do […] And yet eierything that he is he also is not, so his more constant nature is not one of being but of becoming (p. 98).
All of this can seem a litle strange, but it is, in truth, quite simple. The Dictinnaire encyclipédique de la musique 27 defnes "improiisaton" as the "musical executon created as it is played", or "the free, unexpected compositon or perfirmance of a musical passage, generally according to certain freer stylistc norms of the prescribed characteristcs of a specifc musical text", as the Britannica prefers. We, "consciously and purposefully we 'do' the distncton between what is innate and what is artfcial by artculatng the controls of a conientonal, collectie Culture. But what of those peoples who conientonally 'do' the partcular and the incidental, whose liies seem to be a kind of contnual improiisaton?" (pp. 65-66), and where the controls […] are nit Culture, they are not intended to be "performed" or followed as a "code," but rather used as the basis if inventve imprivisatin […] . The controls are themes to be "played upon" and iaried, rather in the way that jazz liies in a constant improiisaton of its subject mater (pp. 66-67).
Additonally, the comparison with music allows us to raise, three complementary points. Firstly, not eierything is permited, and the improiisatons haie to be taken seriously by the others, that is, they cannot lose their relaton to conienton. Since they can also become, as the great jazz pianist Thelonius Monk declared, when interruptng a session of improiisaton, wring mistakes (see p. 64 for the "necessary errors" for the inienton of personality). Secondly, both the noton of style and of interpretaton should be understood, in Wagner, more in the musical than in the culturalist or hermeneutc sense of the term. A good musician is capable of playing in more than one style and of "interpretng" a work in diferent ways. The "oppositon" between conientonal cultures and diferentaton, or between the North Americans and the Daribi, only series to temporarily stabilize the dialectcal tension that exists in any process of symbolizaton, and should only be sustained to the extent that it deliiers a result. But it can also be stabilized within the culture, of an indiiidual or of a singular symbolic act if this was interestng. 28 Finally, it is curious that, in English, imprivisatin can also be said as extempirizatin that, in Portuguese, leads us to the "extemporaneous" and "untmely", that is, to Nietzsche. It is not by accident that the fnal words of The inventin if culture -"too human" -are by this author, cited only one other tme in the book (pp. 65). There is something in the thought of Nietzsche regarding culture as a machine for the repression of life, and creatiity as the only way of escaping from this, that is echoed in the book by Wagner. It is obiious that the anthropologist Wagner, highlights the fact that anthropology can functon as a machine of repression to the extent that it conierts life into culture. If this coniersion is ineiitable, giien that the anthropologist needs it to make the life they chose to liie amongst other people liiable, and later on intelligible, the anthropologist needs to inient a noton of culture that actiely combats its repressiie driie. This is a queston that cannot be fnally resolied and that, giien this, requires us to always return to it. In this sense, the book could be called "Diferentaton of Conientonalizaton" or iiceiersa! To conclude with the ttle, the small artcle "the" remains -but eien this is fundamental. In its absence, the ttle could suggest a generality of the process of inienton that Wagner intends at all costs to aioid. The "the" responds precisely in terms of the abstract character of the concept of inienton of culture, but abstract in the precise sense that only underlines a conditon that can be fulflled in diferent ways, giien that each inienton is always realized according to a partcular style:
And because the percepton and comprehension of others can only proceed by a kind of analogy, knowing them through an extension of the familiar, each style of creatiity is also a style of understanding (p. 27).
It is in this key that the main excerpt regarding what Wagner calls "reierse anthropology" (pp. 30-33), should be understood, which he illustrates using the example of the Melanesian Cargo Cult. It is on one hand to symmetrically imagine the literalizaton of the "metaphors of modern industrial ciiilizaton from the standpoint of tribal society" (p. 30); and, on the other, to understand this "pragmatc sort of anthropology" (p. 32), giien that it eiidently does not take the form of an academic discipline, consttutng, prior to this, an analogy of this, in the sense that one speaks of "reierse engineering". That is, of opening up a black box (in this case, the anthropology itself that we practce) not only with the intenton of uncoiering its functonal mechanisms, but principally, to be capable of reconsttutng them. In summary, the reierse anthropology practced by other societes explains the mechanisms that we employ in an implicit and at tmes, disaiowed manner 29 .
To conclude, we could say that The inventin if culture follows its own assumptons to a much greater extent than the majority of works. The book is shot through by a series of dialectcal contrasts that the author takes care to defne as part of a dialectc not seeking any synthesis (p. 96): contrast between conceptons of culture (chap. 2), modes of symbolizaton (chap. 3), forms of subjectiity (chap. 4), styles of sociability (chap. 5), anthropological theories (chap. 6), amongst others. The idea of synthesis seems to be one of the great threats to thought identfed by Wagner. In the end, the intenton of the great syntheses, or the denouncing of the false ones, its all the same, is only a "strategy of 'protectng anthropology from itself'" (p. 105), defending it from the relatiity that it itself reiealed when it is capable of "to analyze human motiaton at a radical leiel" (p. 13). The frst chapter of the book shows precisely this distance that separates the threatening relatvity that anthropology reieals from the "relatiism" that it professes, relatiism that is the frst form of control of relatiity itself, giien that, as Roland Barthes wrote, "soon one holds oneself in the unalterable heart of things: it is a security, not a disturbance" 30 . For a more serious spirit, "the end of synthetc anthropology" (p. 106), or of "synthesism" (109), with which Wagner concludes the book, could well be understood as the end of anthropology itself. Howeier, as The inventin if culture does not tre of demonstratng, eiery ending is the moment of the inienton of a new beginning. I belieie that in this lies the gamble of Roy Wagner.
I hope that the Wagner that I haie iniented is sufciently fexible to escape from a too quick conientonalizaton. Because nobody need deceiie themselies: eien authors as creatie as Wagner cannot aioid being incessantly "counter-iniented" in the conientonal form of something like a neoDurkheim, whose concepts and ideas would be capable of doing justce to whateier it maybe and to whom we owe respectul deioton. Before "applying him" here and there, it is worth considering the new form of connecton between facts and theories that thoughts such as those of Wagner iniite us to imagine. Certainly, things and ideas are not the same thing, nor the same idea. Howeier, this does not mean that the relatons between them is of the order of a iertcal hierarchy, with some, it does not mater which, being more important than the others. Their relaton, as Guatari would say, is transiersal; for an anthropologist, the queston is how to transiersally trace the relatons between what they learnt in academia and what they saw and that their friends taught them in the feld. Only in this way, will we be able to respond with a defnitie "no" when our friends raise the queston that the Daribi proposed to Wagner: "can you anthropologists intermarry with the goiernment and the missionaries?" Notes 21 As Marilyn Strathern has writen, "ethnographies are the analytcal constructons of scholars; the peoples they study are not. It is part of the anthropological exercise to acknowledge how much larger is their creatiity than any partcular analysis can encompass" (op. cit., p. XII ).
22 "The dullness that we fnd in mission schools, refugee camps, and sometmes in 'acculturated' iillages is symptomatc not of the absence of 'Culture,' but of the absence of its iery antthesis -that 'magic,' that iery swaggering image of boldness and inienton that makes culture, precipitatng its regularites by failing in some fnal sense to oiercome them" (p. 146). In other words, what is missing in these places is life, and the anthropologist should speak in terms of deiitalizaton instead of acculturaton.
23 Which, as we know, corresponds to a style based solely on the efort of rigorously maintaining the rules and the techniques of the schools of formaton. Any similarity with contemporary anthropology is not mere coincidence (see p. 228).
24 See Strathern, "The nice thing about culture is that eieryone has it". In: Shifing cintexts: transfirmatins in anthripiligical kniwledge. London, Routledge, pp. 153-76, 1995.
25 The alternatie would be silence or selfcontemplaton. As Strathern has claimed, "the fact that there is no place outside a culture except in other cultures" raises a technical problem: "how to create an awareness of diferent social worlds when all at one's disposal is terms which belong to one's own." 28 As Strathern has writen, "interpretaton must hold objects of refecton stable long enough to be of use"
